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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
The PARC order has manifold ramifications for the state school
system. The most important effect, obviously, is the new opportunity
created for retarded children. The extent of this opportunity may be
limited, however, by the increased strain upon the finances and facilities
of the state school system. The Majority Leader of the Pennsylvania
House, K. Leroy Irvis, has estimated the cost of educating retarded
children in Pennsylvania to be $131 million per year."' Special educational
classes will doubtless require many new facilities and teachers. In order
to provide the needed revenue, a bill, pending in the United States Con-
gress, would direct the federal government to pay 75 per cent of the costs
involved in educating retarded children.82
In summary, the court has remained well within the established legal
structure in approving the consent agreement. Despite the administrative
and financial problems, the long-range effects of the court's decision appear
to be positive. To deny children an education because of a personal handi-
cap is to deny them an opportunity to attain a certain degree of self-
sufficiency in society. While the administrative problems posed by PARC
may not be resolved for years, the decision is a step toward equal educa-
tional opportunity being afforded to retarded children in Pennsylvania.
Alfred J. D'Angelo, Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FREEDOM OF THE PRESS - NEWSMEN'S
PRIVILEGE - REQUIRING NEWSMEN TO TESTIFY BEFORE STATE OR
FEDERAL GRAND JURIES HELD NOT VIOLATIVE OF FIRST AMENDMENT.
Branzburg v. Hayes (U.S. 1972)
Petitioner Branzburg and respondent Caldwell, both newspaper re-
porters,' were subpoenaed to testify before different grand juries because
their respective newspaper articles concerned matters under grand jury
investigation.2 Both newsmen refused to testify, contending that the first
81. Id.
82. Id.
1. Petitioner Branzburg worked as a staff reporter for the Courier-Journal, a
daily newspaper published in Louisville, Kentucky. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
667 (1972). Respondent Caldwell was a reporter for the New York Times. Id. at 675.
2. Petitioner Branzburg was subpoenaed to testify about his article concerning
illegal dealings in narcotics, id. at 668, while respondent Caldwell was subpoenaed
before a federal grand jury investigating possible violations of a number of criminal
statutes by the Black Panther Party to recount his publications concerning the activi-
ties of that party. Id. at 675.
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amendment prevented a grand jury from compelling them to reveal their
confidant's identity and any information received in confidence.3
A state trial court rejected petitioner Branzburg's first amendment
claim for privilege4 and ordered him to answer all pertinent questions. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court order," and petitioner
pressed his present appeal.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia denied respondent Caldwell's motion to quash the subpoena de-
manding his appearance, but issued a protective order 6 granting him a
qualified privilege to refuse disclosure of confidential information until the
Government demonstrated an overriding interest in requiring his testi-
mony.7 Caldwell, however, refused to appear and was held in contempt
by the trial court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the con-
tempt order, holding that Caldwell need not even appear before the grand
jury until the Government could demonstrate an overriding interest de-
manding his appearance.8
3. The newsmen's argument was basically that, to gather news, it is often neces-
sary for a reporter to assert to his source that his anonymity will be preserved and
that only selected portions of the conversation will be published. Both Branzburg and
Caldwell urged that compulsory testimony would destroy these confidences and thus
curtail the vital flow of news to the public. See id. at 678-79.
4. Petitioner Branzburg also argued for a privilege on the ground that his re-
fusal to answer was authorized by Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.100 (1971), which provides:
No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal proceeding or trial before
any court or before any grand or petit jury, or before the presiding officer of any
tribunal, or his agent or agents, or before any city or county legislative body, or
any committee thereof, or elsewhere, the source of any information procured or
obtained by him, and published in a newspaper or by a radio or television broad-
casting station by which he is engaged or employed, or with which he is connected.
Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Ky. 1970).
5. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970), aff'd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Petitioner Branzburg sought writs of prohibition and mandamus in the Kentucky
Court of Appeals barring enforcement of the lower court contempt order. The court
of appeals denied the writs, holding that Branzburg had abandoned his first amendment
argument in a supplemental memorandum. Id. at 346 n.1. The court summarily dis-
missed Branzburg's argument that the Kentucky Constitution provided a newsmen's
privilege. The court did, however, construe section 421.100 (see note 4 supra) as
granting a reporter the privilege of refusing to divulge the identity of an informant
who supplied him with information, but held that this statute did not grant a newsman
immunity from testifying about events he had observed personally, including the iden-
tities of those persons he had observed. Id. at 347.
Sometime later, petitioner Branzburg wrote another story concerning drugs
for which he was again subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury. He moved to
quash that summons on identical first amendment grounds, and the Kentucky Court
of Appeals again affirmed the denial of his motion. Moreover, the court reaffirmed its
construction of section 421.100 and rejected his first amendment argument based on
its conviction that a newsman's testimony would not impair his effectiveness as a
reporter to a degree that would constitute a violation of the freedom of the press
guaranteed in the first amendment. This second case, Branzburg v. Meigs, was un-
reported, but selected portions are reproduced in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
669, 671 (1972).
6. The order provided that Caldwell did not have to reveal confidential informa-
tion or sources which he had received as a journalist assembling news and passing it
on to the public through the various news media. In re Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 362
(N.D. Cal. 1970).
7. Id.
8. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nor.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Kentucky Court of
Appeals and reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the first amendment
does not accord a newspaper reporter a constitutional testimonial privilege
to conceal information relevant to a grand jury's investigation of a crime.'
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
The common law accorded a newsman no privilege to conceal his
sources before a grand jury, trial court, or legislative committee,' ° primarily
because the public's right to hear every man's evidence was deemed para-
mount to the newsman's desire to protect the confidential relationship with
his source." As early as 1896, however, state legislatures recognized the
need for a statutory privilege, and, to date, seventeen states have enacted
statutes12 granting news reporters various degrees of protection.13 While
9. The Branzburg decision also reviewed In re Pappas- ..... Mass .... , 266
N.E.2d 297 (1971). Pappas, a Providence, Rhode Island newsman, was covering the
activities of the Black Panther Party in Massachusetts and was summoned before a
grand jury in that state. He appeared, claiming a first amendment privilege identical
to that sought by petitioner Branzburg and respondent Caldwell. Id. at -..... 266
N.E.2d at 298. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts which had rejected Pappas' claim for privilege on virtually
the same grounds employed by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 674-75 (1972). Both state courts indicated that the insignificant con-
striction which compulsory testimony worked on the free flow of news did not warrant
a reporter's testimonial privilege. Branzburg v. Meigs, cited in id. at 670-71.
10. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughten ed. 1961) ; Guest
& Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64
Nw. U.L. REV. 18, 20 (1969) ; Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 591 (1966).
11. "For more than three centuries it has been recognized as a fundamental maxim
that the public . . . has a right to everyman's evidence." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2192, at 70 (McNaughten ed. 1961). Dean Wigmore reasoned that the proper
administration of the judicial process commands all citizens to divulge whatever
pertinent knowledge they may have with respect to any judicial investigation. Id. at 73.
12. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1958) ; ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150 (Cum. Supp. 1970) ;
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1966) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1733 (1968) ; Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 421.100 (1971) ; LA. REV. STAT. §§ 45:1451-54 (Supp. 1972) ; MD. ANN. CODE art.
35, § 2 (Supp. 1971) ; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a (1968); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 601-2 (1947) ; NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.087 (1971) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW § 79-H (McKinney Supp. 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12
(Page 1954) ; PA. STAT. tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1972).
13. Thirteen states have statutes couched in terms protecting sources before all
judicial and legislative bodies without qualification: Alabama, Arizona, California,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania. One state - Arkansas - expressly qualifies its statutory
protection by requiring good faith on the part of the newsman. Three states -
Alaska, Louisiana, and New Mexico - have statutes which provide that the protection
is vitiated if a court rulesg that disclosure is essential to the public interest. Six states -
Alabama, Arizona, California, Kentucky, Maryland, and New Jersey - have statutes
which protect only the sources of published information. The remaining states have
statutes which shield sources regardless of whether their information was published
or not. Only three states - Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania - provide the
newsman with immunity from testifying about the information received as well as the
identity of the source. See note 12 supra.
Reported cases construing these statutes are relatively scarce, and with the
exception of In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963), and Beechcroft v. Point
Pleasant Publishing Co., 82 N.J. Super. 269, 197 A.2d 416 (1964), the newsmen's
privilege statutes have been narrowly construed. See, e.g., Farr v. Superior Court,
22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1972) ; In re Howard, 136 Cal. App.
2d 816, 289 P.2d 537 (Ct. App. 1955) ; Lipps v. State, 258 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. 1970);
State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421 (N.J. 1943).
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similar federal legislation has also been introduced, 14 no bill has been
reported out of committee. 15
The newsmen's original claim to a testimonial privilege was premised
on their conviction that coerced identification of confidential sources would
not only impugn the reporter's professional reputation, 16 but also destroy
those confidential sources essential to effective newspaper reporting.17 Such
arguments have uniformly been rejected by jurisdictions without news-
men's privilege statutes,' and the newsman has been forced to reveal his
source or face contempt.
It was not until 1958 that the argument for a constitutional newsmen's
privilege was first propounded. In Garland v. Torre,1 9 the Second Circuit
acknowledged that compelled disclosure of a journalist's confidential sources
could constitute an abridgment of the freedom of the press guaranteed by
the first amendment by limiting the newsman's access to news sources.
Nevertheless, the Garland court concluded that the first amendment news-
men's privilege was not absolute and yielded to the more pronounced
public policy that all witnesses shall testify. 20 Accordingly, the Second
Circuit held that since the identity of the newswoman's source went to
the heart of the plaintiff's claim, it must be revealed.2' The Supreme
Court denied certiorari, 22 thereby refusing to examine the constitutional
argument for a newsmen's privilege at that time.
In the wake of Garland, the judiciary has repeatedly demonstrated a
lack of consistency when grappling with the purported constitutional basis
for a newsmen's privilege. Cases rejecting the privilege have done so for
14. See, e.g., S. 1311, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ; S. 3552, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
:(1970); H.R. 16328, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 16704, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970).
15. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689 & n.28 (1972) ; Guest & Stanzler,
supra note 10, at 21.
16. See, e.g., Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 81, 70 S.E. 781, 785 (1911).
17. See Guest & Stanzler, supra note 10, at 20.
18. See, e.g., Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969), cert.
dismissed per stipulation, 402 U.S. 901 (1971) ; Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler
Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957); Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo. 297, 184 P. 375(1919) ; Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950) ; Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72,
70 S.E. 781 (1911).
Even those states which later enacted newsmen's privilege statutes had not
granted a reporter privilege on common law grounds. See. e.g., Ex parte Lawrence,
116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897) ; In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235, 85 A. 1011 (N.J. 1913)
People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936).
19. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). Judy Garland, in
a suit for defamation and breach of contract against CBS, sought the name of a CBS
"network executive" whose allegedly defamatory statements had been published in
Miss Torre's "gossip" column in the New York Herald-Tribune. Miss Torre was
convicted of contempt of court when she ignored a district court order and refused to
divulge the identity of her informant. On appeal of this contempt citation, Miss Torre
urged, inter alia, that forced disclosure would derogate her first amendment rights.
The Second Circuit rejected the newsmen's privilege argument and held for Miss
Garland. Id. at 550.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
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varying reasons: (1) the identity of the source went to the heart of the
plaintiff's claim;23 (2) other interests outweighed the newsmen's first
amendment rights;24 and (3) the granting of a testimonial privilege to
the press would violate the equal protection clause.25 One court even
declined to articulate any rationale and instead merely summarily rejected
the constitutional argument.26 While a limited number of courts have
recently recognized the constitutional newsmen's privilege in one form
or another, 27 the instant case marks the first time the Supreme Court has
examined the question of whether the first amendment guarantees of
freedom of the press and freedom of speech are abridged by compelling
newsmen to testify before state and federal grand juries under threat of
contempt. In reaching the conclusion that such compulsory testimony did
not violate the first amendment, the Court followed the precedent set forth
by state28 and lower federal2 9 courts, which have consistently applied a
presumption80 against testimonial privileges, and have concluded that any
23. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir. 1958).
24. In re Goodfader, 45 Hawaii 317, 329, 367 P.2d 472, 478 (1961).
25. In State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905(1968), the Supreme Court of Oregon noted that members of the press should have
no greater rights to gather news than any other citizen, and consequently rejected a
student newspaper reporter's claim for privilege, stressing the possible equal protection
implications. Id. at 248-49, 436 P.2d at 731. In so holding, the court noted that freedom
of the press is not a private haven for the news media but a right which belongs with
the public. Id.
26. In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963). While the Taylor court held
that the state newsmen's privilege statute protected newspapers against forced dis-
closure before investigating grand juries, it rejected the constitutional claim to a
privilege as "devoid of merit." Id. at 40, 193 A.2d at 184.
27. See Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 408
U.S. 665 (1972) ("compelling need" test) ; In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp.
573 (N.D. Cal. 1970) ("compelling need" test) ; People v. Dohrn, Crim. No. 69-3808(Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Ill., May 20, 1970) ("miscarriage of justice" test). Even these
cases which recognized a newsmen's privilege utilized different tests in determining
whether the privilege applied.
28. See, e.g., Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48 P. 124 (1897); Joslyn v.
People, 67 Colo. 297, 184 P. 375 (1919) ; Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950) ;
Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911) ; In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235,
85 A. 1011 (N.J. 1913) ; People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E.
415 (1936).
29. See, e.g., Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969), cert.
dismissed per stipulation, 402 U.S. 901 (1971) ; Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler
Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957).
30. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 70 (McNaughten ed. 1961). Dean
Wigmore stated that upon examining any claim for testimonial privilege, the court
should presume that there is a general duty to give whatever testimony a witness
is capable of giving, and any exemption is "distinctly exceptional." Id. The Supreme
Court has enunciated this presumption and reasoned that every testimonial privilege
must be based on a "substantial individual interest which has been found . . . to out-
weigh the public interest in the search for truth." United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S.
323, 331 (1950).
The commentators have suggested that the courts analyze constitutional testi-
monial privileges in a "cart before the horse" fashion. See Guest & Stanzler, supra
note 10, at 39-40. It is submitted that conduct which restrains the flow of news should
be presumed unconstitutional unless strongly justified. Thus, a proper analysis should
begin with the presumption of a constitutional newsmen's privilege and then attempt
to justify its denial because of the public interest in compulsory testimony. Id. A
good example of a situation wherein the constitutional testimonial privilege is pre-
sumed paramount to a common law interest is the right of a witness not to testify on
[VOL. 18
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first amendment interest is outweighed by the general obligation of every
citizen to testify before grand juries.8 1
The Branzburg Court attempted to balance two competing interests
the value of unfettered dissemination of news and the need for more effec-
tive law enforcement. At the heart of the Branzburg opinion is the Court's
determination that the value of protecting the integrity of the grand jury3 2
system outweighs any potential infringement of first amendment freedoms
which result from forcing newsmen to testify concerning matters revealed
to them in confidence. The majority intimated that the grand jury, in
order to best fulfill its role, 83 needs wide-open investigative authority which
in turn mandates extensive subpoena power to question desired witnesses.
3 4
In Watkins v. United States,"5 the Court faced a problem similar to
that presented by the instant case in examining the rights of witnesses
called to testify before a congressional committee investigation. The legis-
lative investigative committees perform a somewhat analogous role to that
of the grand jury,86 and the Court in Watkins provided the witnesses
the grounds that his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination would be violated.
Id. at 28.
It is interesting to note that the Branzburg majority phrased the issue before
it as "the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens
do and to answer questions relevant to an investigation into the commission of crime."
408 U.S. at 682. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in United States v. Caldwell, stated
the issue as "the extent to which the first amendment ... must yield to the govern-
ment's asserted need to know a reporter's unprinted information." Id. at 713 (dis-
senting opinion).
31. 408 U.S. at 686.
32. Although the Branzburg Court assumed that the grand jury performs an
invaluable function in our criminal justice system, the institution has been the subject
of much controversy in recent years, and many commentators question its continued
usefulness. See, e.g.. Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment,
51 A.B.A.J. 153, 155-56 (1965) ; Whyte. Is the Grand Jury Necessary?, 45 VA. L.
REV. 461, 487-91 (1959) ; 104 U. PA. L. RV. 429, 432-33 (1955). Mr. Justice White's
opinion, which stressed the importance of the grand jury, could be viewed as an
attempt by the Court to instill more faith in the 800-year-old institution.
33. The grand jury serves a dual function - to determine if there is probable
cause to believe a crime has been committed and to protect citizens from unwarranted
criminal prosecution. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 556 (1884).
34. 408 U.S. at 688. The Branzburg majority saw two adverse effects on the
grand jury in granting a newsmen's privilege: (1) the concealing of information about
criminal activity by the reporter would render the grand jury's investigation less
thorough; and (2) the determination of preliminary questions in deciding whether
the reporter would be forced to testify would clog the grand jury process. Id. at
692, 705.
In dissent, Mr. Justice Stewart reasoned that a qualified privilege would not
upset the function of the grand jury significantly, but would preserve the reporter's
first amendment rights. See notes 50-54 infra.
35. 354 U.S. 178 (1957). In Watkins, a union leader appeared before the House
Un-American Activities Committee to testify concerning the alleged communist
affiliations of some of his associates. The defendant refused to testify and was con-
victed for violation of a federal statute which required witnesses before a legislative
committee to answer all questions pertinent to the committee's inquiry. Id. at 185.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, concluding that the petitioner must be
able to determine which questions were pertinent, and that no witness could be con-
victed for refusing to answer questions beyond the proper scope of inquiry. Id. at 215.
36. For cases demonstrating the importance of legislative investigations, see, e.g.,
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1959) ; United States v. Rumely,
345 U.S. 41, 43 (1953).
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called to testify with first amendment safeguards."' There, the Court
reversed a lower court conviction of a defendant for violating a federal
statute which compelled witnesses to answer any question pertinent to a
legislative inquiry, stating that the first amendment guarantees must not
be infringed by such a legislative investigation.38 The Watkins Court
refused to limit unnecessarily the first amendment protections because it
felt that such an action would ignore the judiciary's responsibility to
prevent unwarranted arbridgement of individual first amendment rights,89
and consequently the Court concluded that the investigative power of
legislative committees should be wielded carefully.40 Therefore, legislative
committee questioning must now seek information "clearly relevant to a
precisely defined subject of governmental inquiry" in which the Govern-
ment has a compelling and overriding interest.4 1
The Branzburg majority, however, did not seriously consider the
legislative investigation analogy, but instead stressed, among other things,
the more fundamental role of the grand jury investigation.42 After noting
that the grand juries in the instant case were not " 'probing at will without
relation to existing need,' ,,43 the Court concluded that the grand jury's func-
tion in promoting effective law enforcement per se provided an interest over-
riding any possible first amendment ramifications of compelled testimony. 44
By categorically denying the reporter's testimonial privilege in all
grand jury investigations, 45 the Court ignored its own acknowledgment of
judicial responsibility as delineated in Watkins. 46 Although the roles of
the legislative committee and the grand jury are certainly distinguishable,
nevertheless it remains unclear why first amendment protections are appli-
37. 354 U.S. at 198-99.
38. Id. at 188.
39. Id. at 198-99.
40. Id. at 198-201.
41. Cf. 408 U.S. at 744 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied by the Court).
42. Id. at 700.
43. Id., quoting Degregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966).
44. 408 U.S. at 700. The majority did indicate that, if the grand jury investigation
were being conducted in bad faith, then a first amendment privilege would be available
to the reporter. Id. at 707.
45. While the Branzburg majority made it clear that a newsman's claim for
privilege would be denied in the absence of a bad faith grand jury investigation, Mr.
Justice Powell, concurring with the Court's opinion, took a less stern approach to the
problem of balancing the interest in freedom of the press with the obligation of the
citizenry to give testimony relevant to an investigation of criminal conduct. Justice
Powell indicated that courts will protect the newsman not only if the investigation is
being conducted in bad faith, but also if the reporter has a bona fide first amendment
interest in that his testimony "implicates confidential source relationships without a
legitimate need of law enforcement." Id. at 710 (concurring opinion). He further
suggested that the test for granting the privilege should be applied on a case-by-case
basis by balancing "these vital constitutional and societal interests .... ." Id.
It is puzzling that Mr. Justice Powell should join in the rather strict opinion
of the majority while using language very similar to that of Mr. Justice Stewart in
his argument for a qualified privilege. See notes 50-54 and accompanying text infra.
The effect, if any, of Justice Powell's language is as yet uncertain, but it could be used
to soften the majority's almost absolute denial of the newsmen's privilege. Even the
dissent noted that the concurring opinion "gives some hope of a more flexible view
in the future." Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
46. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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7
Coopersmith: Constitutional Law - Freedom of the Press - Newsmen's Privilege -
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
cable to witnesses appearing before a congressional committee but not
to those testifying before a grand jury.
Recent commentary47 and court decisions 48 have suggested that a
qualified privilege49 would best balance the interest in effective law en-
forcement with the conflicting interest in protecting the free flow of news
to the public. The specifics of the qualified privilege were delineated by
Mr. Justice Stewart who stated that before a news reporter could be com-
pelled to testify before a grand jury proceeding, the government must:
1) show there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has in-
formation which is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of
law; 2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained
by alternative means less destructive of first amendment rights; and 3)
demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the information.Y0
47. See, e.g., Guest & Stanzler, supra note 10, at 50; Comment, The Newsman's
Privilege: Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation,
58 CALIF. L. REV. 1198, 1223 (1970); Note, The Right of the Press to Gather
Information, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 838, 861 (1971) ; Note, Reporters and Their Sources;
The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 338 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Reporters and Their Sources].
48. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 322 F. Supp. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1970)
People v. Dohrn, Crim. No. 69-3808 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Ill., May 20, 1970).
49. While most commentary and judicial discussion consider a qualified privilege,
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, maintained that only an absolute privilege would
protect the first amendment rights of the newsman. 408 U.S. at 712. According to
Justice Douglas, the only qualification on the reporter's privilege would arise when
the reporter himself was involved in a crime. Id. His opinion is quite consistent with
his view that the first amendment is written in absolute terms and thus should be
interpreted in an absolute fashion. Any test, such as the "compelling need" test or
the "clear and present danger" test, which applies less than blanket protection, will
eventually become relaxed until ultimately no protection is provided at all. Stating
that "[a] reporter is no better than his source of information," Justice Douglas sub-
mitted that if the Branzburg decision becomes settled law, the reporter will function
as merely a messenger of governmental press releases. Id. at 722.
50. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). There are three main concepts embodied
in the qualified privilege: (1) the probable cause requirement; (2) the alternative
means concept; and (3) the compelling interest test.
The probable cause requirement is designed to prevent the government from
taking a "fishing expedition" at the expense of the press. The loose standards of
materiality and relevance in grand jury proceedings could, absent this provision,
force reporters to reveal information about sources who have neither committed
crimes nor have knowledge of criminal activity. Id. at 744 n.34. See United States v.
Costello, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) ; Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 248 (1910).
The alternative means provision of the qualified privilege ensures that when
the government can serve society's interest in effective law enforcement by methods
that will have no effect on the flow of news to the public, then it should be forced to
pursue those methods. Former Attorney General John Mitchell recognized that
requiring newsmen to testify may sometimes inhibit first amendment rights and
requested that a reasonable attempt be made to obtain information from non-press
sources prior to the issuance of a subpoena to any member of the press. U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, MEMO No. 692 (Sept. 2, 1970), cited in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
707 n.41 (1972).
The compelling interest clause stems from those cases recognizing that
governmental action which has a destructive effect on first amendment rights must be
justified by a "compelling" or "paramount" interest. For example, in Degregory v.
Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825 (1966), the Supreme Court reversed the contempt
conviction of a witness who refused to answer questions concerning his affiliation with
communist organizations. Noting the legislative committee's bona fide role in law-
making, the Court held that the witness' refusal to answer was proper in that "[there
[was] no showing of 'overriding and compelling state interest' that would warrant in-
trusion into the realm of ... the first amendment." Id. at 829, citing Gibson v. Florida
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The qualified privilege attempts to prevent the government from utilizing
the reporter as a general investigative tool,51 but at the same time holds
the newsman accountable to the public.
The majority rejected the qualified privilege, reasoning that the crea-
tion of a qualified privilege would deter confidential sources from giving
information since they would probably fear that the reporter in whom they
confided would be forced to testify concerning his source of information.5 2
Hence, the suggested qualified privilege would not adequately protect the
free flow of news which underlies the newsmen's first amendment argu-
ment.5 3 It is submitted, however, that the Court's reasoning is faulty
because confidential sources are presently willing to supply newsmen with
information in the absence of any privilege,5 4 and it is therefore unlikely
that the judicial recognition of a newsmen's privilege, however qualified,
would deter sources from continuing to divulge information. Conceding
that the qualified privilege is not the perfect answer, the denial of the
privilege is an even weaker solution for it will have little effect in bringing
about more effective law enforcement, because either (1) informants will
fear disclosure and consequently refuse to divulge information, (2) re-
porters will cease to print information received in confidence, or (3) news-
men will choose to go to jail rather than disclose their confidential sources.5
Newsmen are frequently summoned to testify before bodies other than
grand juries, viz., legislative committees and civil or criminal trials. The
language of the Branzburg opinion emphasized the nature and importance
of the grand jury, and its need for wide, untrammeled investigations.
Consequently, it seems clear that the Court intended to close the door to
a constitutional newsmen's privilege only with respect to grand jury
proceedings. 56 Future arguments for a qualified or absolute newsmen's
privilege in non-grand jury settings will be analogous to those presented
in Branzburg, but the majority's reliance upon the function and value of
Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963). For other "compelling interest" cases,
see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963) ; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
524 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 464 (1958) ; Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
51. See 408 U.S. at 742-43 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 702 n.39.
53. The Branzburg majority did not, however, consider the deterrent effect on in-
formers or any resulting constriction on the flow of news as being critical to the issue
before it:
Accepting the fact, however, that an undetermined number of informants not them-
selves implicated in crime will nevertheless, for whatever reason, refuse to talk to
newsmen if they fear identification by a reporter in an official investigation, we
cannot accept the argument that the public interest in possible future news about
crime from undisclosed, unverified sources must take precedence over the public
interest in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by in-
formants and in thus deterring the commission of such crimes in the future.
Id. at 695.
54. See Guest & Stanzler, supra note 10, at 47. It has been observed that the
willingness of reporters to go to jail rather than divulge their sources is recognized by
informants and such willingness is a major reason why these sources continue to give
information to newsmen in jurisdictions without protective statutes. Id.
55. Id. at 44-47.
56. See Reporters and Their Sources, supra note 47, at 345.
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the grand jury may lead future courts to distinguish Branzburg and limit
its application solely to grand jury proceedings. For example, newsmen
appearing before legislative committees could argue that the Branzburg
majority distinguished the legislative committee as performing a less vital
role than the grand jury,5 7 and reporters called as witnesses in civil or
criminal trials could argue the continued vitality of Garland which was
left undisturbed by Branzburg.5  A qualified privilege may very well
emerge in these non-grand jury settings.5 9
The Branzburg Court viewed the newsmen's privilege as granting the
reporter a special exemption from testifying, so as to preserve his ability to
gather news from sources who did not wish to be disclosed.6 0 Reporters
urge that protection of confidential sources is essential to the news gather-
ing process if the press is to remain more than a printer of prepared press
releases. 61 In rejecting the constitutional claim for privilege, the majority
relied on prior cases which had held that the first amendment did not
guarantee the press a constitutional right to gather news not available to
the general public.6 2
In Zemel v. Rusk,G3 the Court constitutionally vindicated the refusal
of the United States Department of State to validate passports to Cuba,
even though such action inhibited the free flow of information concerning
that country, by holding that the first amendment did not confer an
"unrestrained right to gather news."'64 The majority also drew support
from Sheppard v. Maxwell, 5 wherein the Court overturned a murder
57. 408 U.S. at 699-701.
58. In Garland, the Second Circuit recognized the adverse effect which compulsory
testimony placed on the first amendment but, nevertheless, held that when the in-
formant's identity went to the heart of plaintiff's claim, the first amendment implica-
tions were outweighed. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir. 1958). See notes
19-22 and accompanying text supra. Since Branzburg did not undermine Garland, a
newsman's argument for privilege would be successful if he could negate the "heart
of plaintiff's claim" test.
59. For a discussion of the newsmen's privilege in judicial and quasi-judicial
settings, and the varying standards of application, see Reporters and Their Sources,
supra note 47, at 345.
60. 408 U.S. at 682.
61. Id. at 729 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
62. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-30 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) ; In re United Press Ass'ns v.
Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 77, 123 N.E.2d 777, 778 (1954).
63. 381 U.S. 1 (1965). In Zemel, the Supreme Court upheld the State Depart-
ment's refusal to grant the plaintiff a passport to visit Cuba shortly after the United
States severed diplomatic relations with that country in 1962. In so holding, the Court
repudiated the plaintiff's claim that he had a constitutional right to travel abroad and
gather information about foreign countries. Id. at 4. The precise issue of the right to
gather news arose from plaintiff's request for a passport wherein he stated his purpose
for the trip was "[t]o satisfy my curiosity about ... Cuba and to make me a better in-
formed citizen." Id.
64. Id. at 17.
65. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). In Sheppard, the defendant was convicted in a state
court for the murder of his wife. Before and during his trial, petitioner was the sub-ject of extensive media publicity. Throughout the trial, the courtroom was overflowing
with members of the press who repeatedly disrupted the proceedings and publicized
information prejudicial to the defendant. The trial judge, however, denied the defend-
ant's motions to restrain the newsmen and made no attempt to curtail their activities.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and concluded that a defendant's right to
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conviction in a state court because the trial court had allowed newsmen
unfettered access to the courtroom in their efforts to gather news. The
Sheppard Court concluded that newsmen could be barred from gathering
information about a trial if necessary to protect another interest - the
defendant's right to a fair trial. 6 In so relying on Zemel and Sheppard,
the Branzburg Court ignored precedents which afforded protection to the
processes by which news is assembled and disseminated. The right to
publish is central to the constitutional guarantees of free press and free
speech,67 and in order to protect to the fullest extent the right to publish,
the Court had, on prior occasions, recognized additional rights such as the
right to distribute information and the right to receive printed materials.
In Lovell v. Griffin,65 the Court voided a statute which required the con-
sent of a city official before any written material could be distributed
within the city. In its analysis of the first amendment issue, the Court
made it clear that the constitutionality of the statute did not depend on
whether it related to the distribution of literature or its publication. Thus,
the Court recognized a right to distribute information. 9 Again, in Lamont
v. Postmaster General,70 the Court upheld the right of the citizenry to
receive published information and voided a federal statute which required
a written request as a prerequisite to the delivery of nonsealed communist
literature from abroad. In so holding, the Lamont Court noted that the
use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech "as the right to
use our tongues,"7' and concluded that the statutory requirement had a
deterrent effect on first amendment interests. 72
The dissenting justices in Branzburg felt that without these "corollary
rights '73 the right to publish would be unconstitutionally compromised,
and opined that the right to gather news should be recognized as no less
important to the news dissemination process than the other well-established
"corollary rights. ' 74 Upon a proper examination of Zemel and Sheppard,
one can fairly imply that if there is no "unrestrained" right to gather
receive a fair trial was paramount to the public interest in gaining information con-
cerning that trial. Id. at 363.
66. Id. at 359.
67. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
68. 303 U.S. 444 (1938). In Lovell, appellant violated a city ordinance by dis-
tributing a religious pamphlet without the required permission. In overturning her
conviction, the Supreme Court held the statute void on its face, reasoning that
" '[liberty of circulating is as essential .. .as liberty of publishing .... Id. at 452,
quoting Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
69. 303 U.S. at 452.
70. 381 U.S. 301 (1965). In Lamont, the appellant initiated suit to enjoin the
postal authorities from refusing to deliver his copy of the Peking Review until he
signed the requisite statutory request form. Id. at 307.
71. Id. at 305. See United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publish-
ing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921).
72. 381 U.S. at 307.
73. In Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931), the Court sanctioned yet an-
other corollary right - the right to publish without prior governmental approval.
74. 408 U.S. at 727-28 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For a thorough examination of
the right to gather news, see Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71
COLUM. L. REv. 838 (1971).
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information, there must exist some right. 75 While the issue of a right
to gather news has never been squarely before the Court,76 the instant
decision may well place that aspect of the news dissemination process
beyond first amendment protection.
Although the testimonial privilege is claimed by newsmen, the Branz-
burg Court spent considerable time examining the motives of the news-
men's sources. Informants personally involved in criminal activity seek
anonymity to avoid criminal prosecution. 77 With respect to the informa-
tion derived from these persons, the Court saw the privilege as contrary
to effective law enforcement and concluded that the first amendment never
over-rides the public's interest in ensuring that neither the source of the
news nor its reporter is engaged in a course of criminal activity.78 Another
group of informants which usually wishes to remain anonymous comprises
those who have knowledge of the criminal conduct of others, but who have
not personally taken part in the criminal activity. In regard to these
informants, the Court noted that concealment of their knowledge comes
dangerously close to the common law crime of misprision of a felony. 79
It is submitted that the majority was in error when it examined the motives
of the informants. The more appropriate view would be that the first
amendment supports a newsmen's privilege not to reflect the motives of
either the informant or the reporter, but to preserve an atmosphere in
which sources from every political and cultural strain are free to provide
information, through the media, to the public.8 0 On prior occasions, the
Supreme Court has emphasized that the first amendment protects literature
published anonymously, as well as authored materials, and has indicated
75. See 408 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting). From his premise that there is
at least some right to gather news, Mr. Justice Stewart builds a logical ladder to the
reporter's right to enjoy a confidential relationship with his informant. The Justice
urges that one right will lead uncontrovertably to the other if the following three
factual statements are accepted:
1) newsmen require informants to gather news; 2) confidentiality - the promise
or understanding that names or certain aspects of communications will be kept off
the record - is essential to the creation and maintenance of a news-gathering
relationship with informants; and 3) the existence of an unbridled subpoena
power - the absence of a constitutional right protecting, in any way, a confidential
relationship from compulsory process - will either deter sources from divulging
information or deter reporters from gathering and publishing information.
Id. (emphasis supplied by the Court).
76. Several state and lower federal court cases have dealt with the question of a
newsman's right to gather news. See, e.g., Providence Journal Co. v. McCoy, 94 F.
Supp. 186, 195-96 (D.R.I. 1950) (successful action by newspaper company to enforce
the right of its employees to make use of certain public records not available for in-
spection without permission of city council) ; Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734, 739 (Crim.
Ct. App. Okla. 1958) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting television
cameras in the courtroom). But see Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629, 631-32(5th Cir. 1967) (local court rule prohibiting the taking of photographs at any judicial
proceeding held to be a constitutionally permissible restraint on the press).
77. 408 U.S. at 691.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 696. Misprision of a felony is the concealing of a felony committed by
another without such prior agreement with, or subsequent aid to, the felon as would
make the concealing party an accessory before or after the fact. United States v.
Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 1942).
80. 408 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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that many of the same benefits are derived from both. In Talley v.
California,"' the Court voided a municipal ordinance prohibiting the dis-
tribution of anonymous handbills as constituting an abridgment of the
speech and press freedoms guaranteed by the first amendment.8 2 In the
process, the Talley Court noted that anonymous literature has historically
provided the public with a valuable conduit for the free dissemination of
information, and that persecuted groups have best been able to criticize
oppressive practices in the safety of anonymity. 3 The Talley Court con-
cluded that "[i]t is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for
the most constructive purposes. 8s4 Due to the difficulty of a news source
to remain anonymous after the Branzburg decision, publications resulting
from the confidential relationship between reporters and their sources
could be seriously inhibited. The Branzburg majority did not seem to
adhere to the value the Court has previously placed on anonymity in first
amendment conduct.
Aside from its denial of a first amendment newsmen's privilege, the
Branzburg decision did little more than affirm the exceedingly narrow
construction by the Kentucky Court of Appeals of a newsmen's privilege
statute which on its face purported to grant newsmen a wide scope of
protection. 5 In so acting, the Court mentioned nothing of the statute in-
volved, nor of the construction thereof by the Kentucky court, but did state:
There is . . . merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First
Amendment limits, to fashion their own standards in light of the
conditions and problems with respect to the relations between law
enforcement officials and press in their own area. It goes without say-
ing, of course, that we are powerless to erect any bar to state courts
responding in their own way and construing their own constitutions
so as to recognize a newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute.,
The Court correctly refused to make a blanket decision encompassing all
existing state newsmen's privilege statutes, but regrettably, supplied no
standards to guide state legislatures in drafting statutes "within First
Amendment limits." 8 7 The Court also noted that state courts are free to
interpret their own constitutions so as to create a constitutional newsmen's
privilege, but again provided little in the way of guidelines.88 By way of
81. 362 U.S. 60 (1960). The petitioner was fined for attempting to distribute the
handbills of a national consumers organization which urged readers to boycott listed
merchants because of their discriminatory employment practices. Id. at 61.
82. Id. at 65.
83. Id. at 64-65.
84. Id. at 65. The Talley Court adopted the rationale of two prior Supreme
Court cases which had held that states may not force the public identification of
members of groups involved with the dispersion of ideas. See Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516, 523-24 (1960) ; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). Both
cases had recognized that the peaceful discussion of matters of public importance would
be deterred by identification and subsequent fear of reprisal.
85. Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.100 (1971). See note 4 supra.
86. 408 U.S. at 706.
87. Id.
88. id.
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conclusion, the Court invited Congress to create a statutory newsmen's
privilege if disturbed by the instant decision. 9 Federal legislation pro-
posed prior to the Branzburg decision typically permitted nondisclosure of
confidential information and sources before any conceivable federal investi-
gative body, including the grand jury, by any reporter or "other person
directly engaged in the gathering or presenting of news." 90 The proposed
privilege was qualified to the extent that it would not apply where the
defendant in a civil action required the source for his defense, or where
the published information concerned the details of a grand jury or any
other proceeding required by law to be secret. 9 The privilege could also
be overcome by a showing that the information would be required to
prevent a threat to human life, espionage, or foreign aggression.9
The Branzburg Court wisely recognized its own limitations in inter-
preting state legislative action and in constitutional construction, and also
took care not to encroach upon Congress' power to create a newsmen's
privilege. It is clear that newsmen cannot depend upon the United States
Constitution as the basis for privilege before a grand jury, but it is as
yet unclear whether state legislatures will follow Branzburg by refusing
to create newsmen's privilege statutes, or whether state courts will adopt
the approach of the instant decision by narrowly construing state constitu-
tions and existing newsmen's privilege statutes. It is also difficult to
predict whether Congress will continue to seek a newsmen's privilege as
in the previous format, or whether a new proposal will emerge in con-
formity with Branzburg.
In concluding that it is better to fight crime than to write about it,95
the Branzburg Court took too simplistic a view of the newsmen's privilege.
The interest in protecting the free flow of news, to which the Court has
shown an extreme sensitivity,94 is suddenly subordinated to the role of the
grand jury. Perhaps, the Court fears the probable natural extension of
granting a reporter's privilege - the establishment of the right to gather
news, and the creation of a right to special access to information.95
89. Mr. Justice White noted that "Congress has freedom to determine whether a
statutory newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and
rules as narrow and broad as deemed necessary . . . ." Id.
90. See, e.g., H.R. 16328, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).,
91. Id. § 4(b)(2).
92. Id. § 4(b)(1).
93. 408 U.S. at 692.
94. See, e.g., New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Govern-
ment bears the burden of justifying prior restraints on expression) ; Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (rights of privacy subordinate to interest in unfettered
flow of news) ; Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (narrowed definition
of obscenity) ; New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (free flow of news
paramount to individual injury in libel action); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958) (procedural obstacles erected to protect free expression).
95. Commentators have noted that if a newsmen's privilege is granted in order
to protect the reporter's future ability to gather information for the public, the news
gatherer may as well gain the power of access to government records and meetings
under the guise of his future capacity to obtain for the public information about the
activities of public servants. Nelson, The Newsman's Privilege Against Disclosure of
Confidential Sources of Information, 24 VAND. L. REv. 667, 680 (1971).
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